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THE YEAR AT WESTMINSTER: YOUNGER'S UNHAPPY 
CENTENARY 
MARTIN DOWLE 
In July 1985, when George Younger became the longest-serving 
Scottish Secretary in one continuous term his Ministerial colleagues gave a 
surprise dinner for him and presented him with a bed of nails crafted by an 
Argyll silversmith. It was an apt presentation which summed up the lot of 
both the Scottish Conservatives and Younger in the parliamentary session 
just ending. 
If Younger thought that the centenary celebrations of the Scottish 
Office would mark a triumphal crowning of his six-year tenure before the 
reward from the Prime Minister of a senior UK department, he was sorely 
mistaken. His time was taken up instead with major Ministerial battles 
which forced him time and again to cash in much of the credit stored up over 
the years with his Cabinet colleagues to see him out of some of his greatest 
political crises so far. 
But if it was a traumatic year for the Scottish Conservatives, as they 
wrestled with growing unpopularity over rating revaluation, the teachers' 
dispute and doubts over their capacity to safeguard the remains of the 
Scottish steel industry, it was an equally frustrating session for the 
opposition parties. With no prospect of an election on the horizon, Labour, 
the Alliance and the SNP seemed incapable of turning the evident huge 
public discontent with the Tories to their advantage, and they wearily 
ploughed their own furrows with little impact on either the life of 
Westminster or the outside world. 
1. Rating revaluation: The Tories in crisis 
The irony of rating revaluation, which plunged the Scottish Tories into 
their worst internal crisis since the split over the Declaration of Perth more 
than a decade before, was that it should have been the most easily avoided 
of the problems which dogged the Scottish Office team during the year. 
Indeed, the process had been delayed from 1983 to 1985 precisely because 
of the adverse effect Ministers knew it would have on their electoral 
prospects in that year. 
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Nevertheless, despite ample warning from civil servants (some of 
whom considered their professional advice on the likely outcome of 
revaluation as sailing close to the wind in explaining the political 
consequences) Ministers later argued that the episode had caught them 
unawares, and once the delayed response from the constituencies had 
filtered back by February 1985, four months after the original decision, it 
was too late for the reversal of the policy sought by Tory activists up and 
down Scotland. 
The events surrounding revaluation ran parallel to a wider concern 
inside the Tory Party about local government finance in general, with 
Ministers under assault from two distinct lobbies: one protesting at the 
impact of the tightening of central Government control on local 
democracy; the other annoyed at the continuing growth of rates bills 
demanding reform of the system, though with little consensus in its ranks 
about what should replace rates. 
The Government avoided open internal party discontent at the Tory 
conference in Brighton in October 1984 by establishing a Ministerial 
committee headed by Kenneth Baker, its dynamic middle-ranking local 
government Minister, selected by Mrs Thatcher to take on Ken 
Livingstone, the charismatic London Labour leader, in the battle over 
abolition of the Greater London Council and the metropolitan counties. 
The committee, which included Michael Ancram, the Scottish local 
government Minister, was to assume a central importance as the pressure 
north of the Border over revaluatioin put rating reform back at the top of 
the political agenda the following spring, and led the Prime Minister to 
inject fresh political impetus into the old search for a viable alternative to 
the present system. 
Pressure on Ministers on the revaluation issue built up steadily in 
February as assessors' notices landed on the doormats. Horrified lifelong 
Tory voters forced their constituency associations into major protests to 
their MPs and Ministers, which culminated in an unsuccessful journey to 
London by Sir James Goold, the Scottish Conservative Party chairman, to 
tell the Prime Minister and Younger of the need to abandon the change. 
But Ministers stoutly resisted, and Ancram was forced to mount a defence 
of the decision that cut little ice back home in the constituencies, where 
revaluations of four or five-fold were common. 
"Revaluations are always difficult because by their nature they 
produce gainers and losers," he argued early in March. "For those who find 
they are paying heavier rates bills it is unpleasant. But at the same time it is 
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a fair system because it ensures that the burden of rates is shared out fairly 
according to the value of properties." 
As it became clear that there would or could be no retreat by the 
Government, Scottish Tory backbenchers and constituency activists turned 
their attention to the party's annual conference at Perth in May. Worried by 
their slump to below 20 per cent in Scottish opinion polls, about 8 per cent 
lower than their past poor general election showing, fiercely critical 
motions on the subject were sent in to Central Office, typified perhaps by 
that from Edinburgh Pentlands which broke with traditional Tory reserve 
to criticise Ministers of being "uncharacteristically dilatory and 
incompetent". 
If the senior ranks of the Government had not yet got the message, 
they soon would. Viscount Whitelaw, previously unaware of the depth of 
feeling on the issue as he wrestled with the day-by-day problem of securing 
a majority for the Conservatives in the Lords, returned from a party visit to 
Scotland shocked by the mood. He immediately went to Downing Street to 
convey his impressions, and Mrs Thatacher, if she had not already been 
alerted to the warning signals, now began taking a close personal interest. 
The scene then shifted to the Treasury. Younger financed an extra 
£38.5 million out of his own block grant to raise the level of revaluation 
relief from 5p to 8p in the pound. In doing so, however, regional aid 
(already badly hit by Norman Tebbit's large-scale cutbacks the previous 
autumn) suffered by more than £5 million; approximately the.same was 
lopped off roads and transport, and separately the same off prisons and 
health. But the main loser was local authority housing, which was cut by 
£10.5 million. 
It swiftly became evident that the extra £38.5 million was not enough to 
assuage feeling in the country, though it was greeted by Sir James as "a step 
in the right direction". Ministers soon realised that money was also needed 
to limit the burden on commercial ratepayers, many of them the 
Government's natural supporters as small businessmen. MPs and the party 
in general kept up the pressure: Nicholas Fairbairn, whose own district 
council of Perth and Kinross was shortly to slip out of Tory hands, accused 
the Government of betrayal and argued that the "mad" system of rate 
support grant which penalised the thrifty as well as the big spenders, meant 
that all Scottish ratepayers faced ruin. 
Shaken, rio doubt, by the loss of a previously safe regional seat in his 
own constituency of Ayr, Younger moved to cash in some of his credit at 
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the Treasury. He was brought face to face again with Peter Rees, the 
Financial Secretary, whose success in maintaining a fierce downward 
pressure on Scottish and English local government spending in the two 
previous public expenditure scrutiny rounds had lain at the root of the 
crisis. 
With Younger, Whitelaw and Ministers from other departments who 
represented Scottish seats all pointing to the possibility of electoral oblivion 
for the Tories north of the Border at the next election, Thatcher threw in 
her lot with those who wanted to take the unusual step of dipping into the £5 
billion contingency reserve to help retrieve the Government's position at 
the Perth conference. The £50 million wrung out of the Treasury was at 
least five times the amount expected by any delegate, and indicated the 
strength of Younger's position in the Cabinet hierarchy. But it was granted 
with bad grace by Nigel Lawson, the Chancellor, who vowed that next year 
the money would all have to be financed out of the Scottish Office block 
grant. 
Although the whole episode demoralised the Scottish Conservatives 
more than any other issue during the year, it remained a strangely internal 
political dispute with the other parties almost accepting the view that it 
would be wrong to intrude on family grief. So far as Labour was concerned, 
this was largely because Donald Dewar, the Shadow Scottish Secretary, 
took a rather principled stand in refusing to clamour for greater sums of 
money on the grounds that it was likely to damage other parts of the block 
grant, as in the case of the £38.5 million for domestic ratepayers. 
But it was also because he viewed the matter as part of a wider picture. 
Labour had, for example, supported the principle of industrial derating, as 
a means of preserving jobs, a measure introduced since the previous 
revaluation which had shifted the burden from industrial onto domestic 
and, to a lesser extent, commercial ratepayers. Labour also believed that 
revaluation was just another symptom of the problems caused by the 
Government's restrictive policies on local government in general. 
However, Labour also had its own problems with three of its 
councils,in Aberdeen, Stirling and Edinburgh, threatening to defy 
Younger over their rate levels. This inhibited the party's argument that the 
Government was solely responsible for the average 27 per cent rates 
increase for the year. Notwithstanding the problems of Government and 
Opposition on the issue, both the Alliance and the SNP found themselves 
unable to make much headway on the issue, though in the longer term each 
might find itself a beneficiary in terms of seats if discontent among natural 
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Tory voters continued up to the end of the Parliament. 
As the revaluation crisis reached its climax, Younger moved into the 
vanguard of those demanding reform of the rating system itself on the 
statute book in time for the next election in 1987 or 1988. Shortly before 
senior Ministers gathered at Chequers for a weekend summit to report 
progress to the Prime Minister, he declared in forthright terms: "This time 
we have got to deliver. Nobody is prepared to put up with the system as it is, 
and I agree with them." 
Though his suggestion that Scotland could move ahead with reform 
before England, was dismissed by Thatcher, she soon forced the pace at the 
UK level by demanding a White Paper by the autumn, and she pencilled in 
legislation for the 1986/7 parliamentary session. Even so, the Baker 
Committee found the task hard going. Though pressed by the New Right, 
with a great deal of grassroots party support, to implement a 
straightforward poll tax as a solution, calculated by Michael Forsyth, the 
MP for Stirling, at £170 a head, this met much resistance from those 
opposed to a regressive form of taxation and was watered down into one of 
a number of elements in a possible final package. 
2. Politics in a cold climate 
Privately, and at times publicly, the Scotish Tories conceded that the 
issue apart from rates, which damaged them most in public perception was 
that of the Department of Health and Social Security's cold climate 
allowance. The refusal of Tony Newton, the ~ocial Security Minister, and 
ultimately the Prime Minister herself, to budge on the issue as more south 
coast resorts qualified with temperatures which had yet to fall below zero 
while Scotland remained out in the cold in one of its bitterest winters for 
years, left the indelible impression of a Government which just did not 
care. 
The initial running on the issue was made by the SNP's chairman and 
the Dundee East MP, Gordon Wilson. But he was swiftly joined by Labour 
MPs, in particular Donald Dewar and Gordon Brown, the party's coming 
expert on social security issues, and the discontent with the Tories on the 
issue failed to manifest itself in any movement of support between the 
Opposition parties. In the end, the embarrassment for the Conservatives 
was resolved by the simple expedient of abolishing the payments in the 
Fowler reviews together with its complicated system of trigger mechanisms 
which was based on temperatures falling below their normal averages, 
rather than compensating those with heating problems in perenially cold 
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(and particularly damp) areas of the country. 
Without doubt the most intractable problem of the year for the 
Scottish Office team was the teachers' dispute, which demonstrated the 
strict limits of the department's independence from central Government 
when it comes to dealing with questions with clear knock-on effects in other 
areas. With the Government's thinking on public sector pay policy 
governed by its refusal from 1979 to follow Labour's example of Clegg-style 
commissions under which Governments granted the recommendations 
however large in a staged manner to fit in with pay norms of the time, 
Ministers were prevented by the centre from coming anywhere near 
conceding the central teachers' demand of an independent pay review 
whose recommendations would be honoured in full. 
Though the Scottish Office was able to earmark considerably more for 
an eventual settlement than its counterpart for England and Wales, the 
prospects for a settlement evaporated as the financial year ran out and 
Younger lost the ability to move the money over into the new year. But in 
any event relations between the Scottish Office and the Educational 
Institute for Scotland had gone from bad to worse not least because of the 
targetting of Ministers' constituencies and the fierce response that that 
brought from them in return. 
Labour made much of the running on the dispute in Parliament, 
though it was left to one Opposition MP in particular, George Foulkes, the 
former Lothian education convener, to suggest a compromise of an 
independent pay review to be held under the auspices of the Scottish joint 
negotiating committee. But the move came to naught as the two sides in the 
dispute drifted further apart and as the Scottish Office lost its "ring fence" 
around the subject as a similar confrontation built up in England and 
Wales, requiring a general co-ordination of policy. 
The technique of targetting inhibited Labour from giving the full-scale 
support which it would in other circumstances have given to the EIS, which 
provides it with many of its constituency activists. But after the 
abandonment of the strategy that support grew warmer, and it paid 
substantial dividends when public sympathy swung back in favour of the 
teachers when in July the Prime Minister implemented in full the 
recommendations of the Plowden Committee on top peoples' pay, 
acceding to the report of an expert, independent pay body - the course 
which she had vowed not to take after she abandoned the Clegg system in 
1979. 
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Targetting may have concentrated the minds of Ministers, particularly 
George Younger and Allen Stewart, the Minister for Education and 
Industry, on the issues, but it also caused a backlash amongst a number of 
Tory MPs who would otherwise have had sympathy with the teachers' 
cause, and there is little doubt that it contributed to a hardening of attitude 
on the part of the Government in the first six months of 1985. 
One of the other major topics to dominate the parliamentary session 
was the review of airports policy by Nicholas Ridley, the Transport 
Secretary. Because of their small number, Scottish MPs were unable to 
stage the kind of revolt that Ridley faced from English MPs over the plan to 
extend Stansted (which led for a time to the withdrawal of the 
Government's White Paper) but they were nonetheless able to mount a 
skilful lobbying campaign which forced the Transport Secretary to abandon 
his opposition to Prestwick staying as the international gateway to 
Scotland. 
The campaign was co-ordinated behind the scenes by Younger 
himself, who used all his Cabinet clout to safeguard his Ayr constituency 
interests. He mobilised the Scottish Select Committee under the 
chairmanship of his fellow Ayrshire MP, David Lambie, along with others 
like George Foulkes, and added to their number Michael Hirst, the 
Conservative MP for Strathkelvin and Bearsden, whose constituents lay 
under the proposed flightpath for additional flights into Glasgow Airport. 
Opponents of this coalition- namely Michael Forsyth and Anna McCurley, 
two of the new Conservative MPs, found no support for their amendments 
in the Select Committee seeking to prevent any recommendations that 
could prejudge the Government inquiry. 
The clinching factor in the campaign appeared to be the calculation by 
a Department of Transport working party that closure would be as costly as 
retention over the next three years, an argument which was the basis of a 
practical response from Younger to those monetarists such as Ridley who 
had argued that it should make a profit or die. But Younger nevertheles!' 
had to accept that Prestwick would face closure in 1989 unless it was able to 
turn around its annual loss of £3.5 million which was biting deeply into the 
British Airport Authority's profitability. 
But the litmus test for Younger in the centenary year came in the 
summer when it became evident that the uneasy compromise over 
Ravenscraig would be challenged by the British Steel Corporation which 
preferred closure and the concentration of its strip-mill production on the 
two South Wales plants, Llanwern and Port Talbot. The issue had assumed 
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an almost cardinal significance in Scottish politics after the bulk of the 
Scottish Tories in 1982 had agreed with the Opposition parties that its 
retention was essential to any future prospect of a heavy industrial base 
inside Scotland, and was also seen as of critical importance to Younger's 
policies after he had issued dark threats of resignation at the time of the 
Conservative conference in Brighton in autumn 1982. 
Fears that this time round he might not be so successful in the battle, 
despite the enormously improved production record of the workforce, 
were heightened by the belief of a generally hostile attitude on the part of 
Norman Tebbit, the Trade and Industry Secretary, and his junior industry 
minister, Norman Lamont. But although both retained a firm adherence to 
a policy of strict profitability and to the need for a reduction in capacity to 
meet demand, it soon became evident that they had not raised strong 
objections to retention in Cabinet sub-committee meetings. 
Indeed, it would have proved futile for them to do so, for the Prime 
Minister herself considered that the role played during the year-long 
miners' strike by the Ravenscraig workforce, which worked on in the face 
of demands for total closure of the works by both the National Union of 
Mineworkers and the dockers, had been of crucial importance in helping 
her "see off" (in her own words) the two dock strikes almost exactly a year 
before. After publicly having thanked the 4,000-strong workforce for their 
stand, it would have been particularly damaging politically for her to turn 
round and announce its closure, and Younger made the most of this 
argument in the Ministerial discussions on the future of the steel industry. 
Opposition spokesmen criticised him for an unusual reticence in failing 
to match his Welsh opposite number, Nicholas Edwards, who loudly 
trumpetted the case for Llanwern during June and July 1985 on virtually 
every available occasion. By contrast, Younger simply pointed out his 
position on the future of Ravenscraig was well known, and that the decision 
would be announced in due course. Meanwhile, the same cross-party 
alliance as in 1982 in favour of the plant began its lobbying campaign. The 
unanimity inside the Scottish Conservative Party was disrupted only by 
Michael Forsyth, the Right-wing MP for Stirling, who incurred the wrath of 
Sir Hector Monro, one of the party's senior backbenchers, for suggesting 
on the eve of the Scottish Select Committee's visit to the plant that if it was 
not viable it should close. 
While Younger and his Ministerial team backed the case for £90 
million in investment for Ravenscraig's ageing coking ovens, the argument 
put forward by Tcbbit and Lamont that the plant should remain open but 
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should not receive the extra funding was finally agreed inside the 
Government and subsequently with the BSC, which had included the 
decision in its corporate plan in August 1985. The outcome was, in fact, a 
reiteration of the Patrick Jenkin compromise of December 1982, right 
down to the detail that Ravenscraig once again had secured a three-year 
reprieve from those wishing to close it for good. 
Although Younger could technically claim to have maintained his 
promise to save Ravenscraig, it was seen by the unions and the Opposition 
as a Pyrrhic victory, being accompanied by the announcement of the 
closure of the Gartcosh rolling-mill and the loss of 800 jobs. That decision 
meant that in future the bulk of Ravenscraig's steel output would have to go 
to the modern cold-rolling mill and steel-coating complex at Shotton in 
North Wales, thus knocking a hole in the Conservative's claim to a 
commitment to an integrated steel production capacity in Scotland. As 
Younger proclaimed that the decision reaffirmed the future of 
Ravenscraig, Dewar placed a different interpretation on the corporate 
plan, saying it would greatly weaken the Scottish steel industry through the 
closure of Gartcosh. 
For Labour, the 1984/5 parliamentary session was a difficult one, 
dominated as it was by the NUM strike against the Coal Board to try to 
safeguard pit communities from closures. Scotland's Labour MPs did not 
have to deal with the problem of a response to working miners in the way 
that many of their colleagues south of the Border did, but instead found 
their work cut out in advocating the cases of those who fell foul of the much 
tougher decision by the NCB in Scotland to refuse to re-employ miners 
convicted of even the most trivial offences during the dispute. 
Donald Dewar, in much the same way as Neil Kinnock, the party 
leader, at national level, had to remind his colleagues and the Labour Party 
in the country that the pursuit of the miners' strike was no substitute for an 
election victory in 1987/88, which would be the only way the party could 
gain power. Kinnock, arriving at the annual Perth conference in the 
aftermath of the collapse of the strike, had much fence-mending to 
undertake with some of his Scottish colleagues, and smoothed over the 
troubled waters only to disrupt matters again with an outspoken attack on 
the rates rebels of Edinburgh, Aberdeen and Stirling. 
As all this was going on, the sixth anniversary of the Scotland Act 
referendum passed with the minimum of fuss at Westminster on March 1. 
Labour's Scottish whip, John Maxton, was unsuccessful in persuading the 
Government to concede a debate on the issue in the Scottish Grand 
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Committee, which he had hoped could sit for the purpose at the Crown 
Buildings in Edinburgh, once earmarked for the Assembly that never came 
into being. 
In the event it was probably just as well for Labour that the debate did 
not take place. The consultations by the most avid pro-devolution MPs on a 
Green Paper on the subject had aroused little public response, and a Ten 
Minute Rule Bill calling for an Assembly the week after was opposed in the 
Commons not by the Conservatives, but by Mark Hughes, the Labour MP 
for Durham. He attracted eight Northern English MPs into the No lobby 
against the Bill, thus demonstrating that the efforts in the previous year by 
John Prescott, then the party's spokesman on regional development (which 
culminated in the suggestion of regional assemblies with industrial powers 
for areas of England) had not removed animosity towards Scottish Home 
Rule. 
Two months later, Kinnock privately met the Scottish group of Labour 
MPs at Westminster to discuss devolution, and it swiftly emerged that many 
of them remained unconvinced that the old opponent of the Wales Act was 
committed to Scottish devolution. As the session closed, there was a 
distinct difference of opinion between those fervent Home Rulers who 
demanded legislation in the first Parliamentary session under a Labour 
Government, and the party leadership, which argued that it could not be 
accorded such a priority by an administration pledged above all else to 
economic recovery and stamping out unemployment. 
It was a year of frustration for the Alliance parties, which despite 
merging their efforts in Scotland at large found that it remained difficult to 
make an impact at Westminster, even though they boasted 8 out of 
Scotland's 72 MPs. In a concerted effort to tackle the two-party domination 
of Commons proceedings, they adopted the tactic of placing all their 
questions for Scottish question time on one particular topic on each 
occasion in the hope of maximising media coverage. 
3. Legislation: The Fight for TSB Scotland 
In a generally dull year for Scottish Iegislation,the scene was enlivened 
in April1985 by the controversy over the flotation of the TSB caused when 
the Lords voted to establish the TSB Scotland as an independent bank. 
The vote, by 67 to 54, was one of a catalogue of embarrassments for the 
Government in the Upper House, but more importantly caused problems 
for the Treasury as the department sponsoring the measure on behalf of the 
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TSB board. The Government defeat came at an extraordinarily late point 
in the legislation's passage, and after a number of MPs on a cross-party 
basis had warned of the consequences of floating off the bank on the terms 
proposed by Sir John Read, the chairman of the TSB group. 
Gordon Wilson, the SNP chairman, and Jim Craigen, one of Labour's 
Scottish front -bench spokesmen, had little success in their efforts to interest 
colleagues in the effect of the Bill, which they felt would spell the end of 
TSB Scotland's independence. As Wilson pointed out in The Scotsman in 
February 1985, he had been "taken aback" when he read the provisions of 
the Bill, as up until then he had had found notions gleaned from the highly 
professional television advertisements that the TSB was a Scottish bank 
with its roots firmly established in the country which had given birth to the 
TSB movement_<ll 
He was horrified by the provision in the Bill which liquidated the old 
TSB group which had worked on a confederal basis with autonomy 
reserved to the partner banks, dissolved the existing banks, 1>acked their 
trustees and transferred all assets and obligations to a new TSB group which 
would issue shares on a UK basis and control overall policy. Wilson 
dismissed the arguments of the TSB that the Scottish bank would retain its 
autonomy and be responsible for its own investment portfolio 
management, and instead pointed out that the bank itself said that the key 
criteria for all investment decisions would be the long-term rate of return. 
It took Scottish parliamentarians some time to wake up to the 
importance of the TSB in Scotland, and it was only when it was generally 
recognised that it was a major competitor in the Scottish banking scene, 
with 2 million accounts, 1.25 million customers and a 25 per cent 
penetration of the personal savings market, that MPs treated it with the 
seriousness which they had earlier shown in the successful fight to retain the 
independence of the Royal Bank of Scotland. 
But these arguments took a considerable time to filter into the minds of 
most MPs, and it was significant that when the TSB Bill came up for its 
Second Reading in the Commons in January 1985, the Labour front -bench 
Treasury team rejected the arguments of Craigen and adopted an officially 
neutral stance towards the measure. It was passed, therefore, by 204 votes 
to 37, a healthy Government majority of 167. 
When the measure reached the Lords, it appeared that the 
Government whips would meet as littl.;: resistance as in the Commons when 
it won a Second Reading there by 113 votes to 76. But in its committee 
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stage, Lord Taylor of Gryffe, an SDP peer and chairman of Morgan 
Grenfell (Scotland) Ltd, pulled off what he described as "quite a coup" in 
persuading fellow peers to vote for an amendment which would float it off 
as an independent Scottish bank. 
Lord Taylor's argument that the bank could stand on its own feet and 
make an even greater contribution to the expansion of Scottish financial 
services was backed by a surprisingly wide range of speakers from all parts 
of the Lords, including Lord Ross of Marnock, the former Labour Scottish 
Secretary, Lord Grimond, the former Liberal leader, and the Earl of 
Selkirk. But as the dust settled, the Treasury argued that the Bill could not 
be left as it was with the amendment in it because it contradicted the very 
purpose of the legislation and left it completely unworkable. 
Intense negotiations then began with a firm desire, particularly in 
Downing Street, on the part of the Government to see the measure 
returned to its original state. Sir John Read as chairman of the central board 
doubted the potential viability of an independent TSB Scotland, but 
George Younger as Scottish Secretary dropped heavy hints that he could 
throw his weight behind the proposed changes if there was sufficient 
evidence of a desire for independence among the depositors and 
employees. Alex Fletcher, the Minister for Corporate and c;onsumer 
Affairs, similarly argued for a solution that gave the Scottish operation the 
maximum degree of independence, but stressed that the impetus had to 
come from within the private sector itself. 
In the end, however, the controversy subsided almost as inexplicably 
as it arose, demonstrating the limitations any revolt in the Lords can have 
on the Government of the day which in the end carries the electorate's 
mandate. Lord Taylor appeared well satisfied with a series of modest 
concessions from the central board which fell well short of the original 
ambitions of the rebellious peers. He accepted an extra clause enshrining 
the "establishment and preservation" of the TSB Scotland and the three 
other subsidiaries within the proposed group holding company. In effect, 
the clause made it impossible for any future central board to merge TSB 
Scotland with the rest of its operations without further legislation being put 
through Parliament. 
A week later, three further concessions were offered and accepted by 
the architects of the amendment. The TSB agreed to establish its registered 
office for the whole holding company in Edinburgh; offered to hold the 
annual general meeting in Edinburgh; and promised that "substantial 
holdings" in the group would be offered to Scottish financial institutions; "I 
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am conscious of the Government's substantial majority in both Houses," 
Lord Taylor said. "We have obtained substantial concessions for Scotland 
which would not have been obtained but for my amendment." 
As he departed for a business trip to the United States, he left the 
forces fighting for an independent TSB Scotland in disarray. Wilson 
dismissed the proposals as "the merest of empty gestures" and he ~nd his 
allies across party lines fought a rearguard action when the amendments 
came to the Commons for approval. There was a flurry of excitement when 
Wilson unveiled a "mole" who had written to 13 MPs giving details of legal 
opinion by a prominent QC to the central board which argued that since the 
bank as an unincorporated institution was owned by its depositors -directly 
contrary to the argument of the Government White Paper in December 
1983 that ownership had never been established and that it did not belong to 
the trustees, their employees or their depositors. 
But the debate on the Lords amendments itself failed to live up to the 
earlier promise of an exciting evening, despite the revelation of Nicholas 
Fairbairn that his deposit account had risen through interest over 28 years 
from £110s 6d to £2.68 Craigen and Wilson both expressed their discontent 
with the final state of affairs, the former dismissing Lord Taylor's claim that 
he had won "more than h~lf a loaf', and arguing instead that the 
concessions amounted to "little more than a handful of grain". When at the 
end of the debate the Government secured its amendments by 193 votes to 
69, it was clear that six months of a major campaign on the issue had 
resulted in the conversion of only 30 MPs to the cause of an independent 
TSB Scotland. 
4. Younger's law of diminishing returns 
The Scottish Office's centenary year proved to be the toughest so far 
for Younger and his ministerial team as they tried to reconcile central 
Government policy to the political realities on the ground. It was becoming 
increasingly clear that on a whole range of fronts they were failing to gain 
even a grudging acceptance of the policies from a wide range of interest 
groups, let alone the electorate at large. 
The rating reva1uation crisis in particular indicated the extent to which 
Younger has had to use his final and most unenviable weapon in Whitehall 
battles - that of pointing out to colleagues the consequences of political 
annihilation north of the border if the Government's strategy is not 
ameliorated. 
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It was not an argument to which the Prime Minister and her closest 
political allies paid much attention in the heady days of the Falklands 
victory and the afterglow of the landslide election victory of June 1983. 
Conservative MPs from the south-east have long resented what is viewed as 
preferential treatment for Scotland, and that view has been reinforced in 
this Parliament by the arrival of large numbers of first-term MPs from 
Midlands and the northern constituencies in England in marginal seats with 
similarly poor economic prospects and unemployment levels to those found 
in Scotland. 
It is a view with which Thatcher and Tebbit, for example, would agree 
instinctively. They find Scotland's continued hostility to the Tories 
incomprehensible, particularly since during the year council housing 
dropped for the first time below the 50 per cent level as a result of the 
"Right to Buy" legislation. When Thatcher set a demoralised party 
conference at Perth the challenge of restoring the position of the 
Conservatives to their high point of the 1950s, she expected them to do so 
by selling the virtues of self-help, entrepreneurship and less governmental 
interference. 
On closer reflection, English Tories know that a "devil may care" 
attitude towards Scotland does not stand up to examination. They know 
that a narrowing of their political base would make Scotland more, not less, 
difficult to govern. In addition, as the Government's fortunes plummetted, 
Conservative perspectives changed as they came to realise the importance 
of every seat in a closely-fought election which might result in a hung 
Parliament. 
Though rating revaluation loomed as the largest issue of the year, the 
battle over Ravenscraig may in retrospect prove to be the more signi~icant 
in political terms. It could certainly prove to be the most damaging to 
Younger's reputation- and the Government as a whole- over the coming 
year. 
A foretaste of what was to come was given in August as the 
Conservatives began to fall out among themselves over the significance of 
the decision to close Gartcosh for the future of Ravenscraig. Sir Hector 
Monro, the chairman of the Conservative backbenchers, noticeably 
distances himself from Younger by opposing the closure of Gartcosh and 
affirming Labour's view that it formed an efficient and integral part of 
Scotland's steel-making complex. 
Monro's move left Younger almost totally isolated within the Scottish 
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political spectrum on an issue on which three years before he had staked his 
reputation as Scottish Secretary. Though the implications have yet to 
manifest themselves, they will no doubt do so in the coming year. Yet it is 
already clear it demonstrates Younger's strategy of seeking compromises 
for Scotland in Cabinet to be a law of diminishing returns. After six years, 
his tightrope act has begun to wear a bit thin. 
Martin Dowie. Chief Political Correspondent of The Scotsman 
Reference 
1. The Scotsman, 20th February, 1985. 
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